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BROWER AND SAENZ ON  
DIVINE TRUTHMAKER SIMPLICITY
James R. Beebe
Jeffrey Brower has recently articulated a way to make sense of the doctrine 
of divine simplicity using resources from contemporary truthmaker theory. 
Noël Saenz has advanced two objections to Brower’s account, arguing that it 
violates constraints on adequate metaphysical explanations at various points. 
I argue that Saenz’s objections fail to show that Brower’s account is explana-
torily inadequate.
I.
The doctrine of divine simplicity (which finds expression in the works of 
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas,1 inter alia) is the view that God is abso-
lutely simple, lacking any distinct metaphysical parts or constituents. This 
means that God is not even distinct from God’s goodness, God’s power, 
or God’s wisdom, which in turn means that God’s goodness is not dis-
tinct from God’s power or God’s wisdom. If any of these items failed to be 
identical, God would have components and would not be metaphysically 
simple after all.
Alvin Plantinga has provided the most famous contemporary articula-
tion of the central challenges facing such a view:
There are two difficulties, one substantial and the other truly monumental. 
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each 
of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but 
one property. This seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God 
has several properties; he has both power and mercifulness, say, neither of 
which is identical with the other. In the second place, if God is identical 
with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he 
is a property—a self-exemplifying property. Accordingly God has just one 
property: himself. This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and over-
whelming. No property could have created the world; no property could be 
omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all.2
1Cf. Brower “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 5 ff. for details on the historical roots 
of this doctrine.
2Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 47.
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For reasons such as these, the doctrine of divine simplicity has fallen upon 
hard times.
In a recent attempt to articulate and defend an account of divine sim-
plicity that avoids standard objections to it, Jeffrey Brower draws upon 
recent work in metaphysics on truthmaker theory.3 Truthmakers are the 
entities in virtue of which truths are true.4 What is unique to the cur-
rent debate about truthmakers is not the idea that truths are grounded 
in reality but the prominence of the idea that truths can sometimes be 
grounded in entities themselves as opposed to (facts about) how those 
entities are. Taking this notion as his point of departure, Brower argues 
that the doctrine of divine simplicity can be explained and shown to be co-
herent by taking it to be the thesis that the truthmaker for divine essential 
predications is a metaphysically simple entity, viz., God.5 Somewhat more 
formally, Brower’s view is the following:
(DTS) If an intrinsic essential predication of the form “God is F” is true, 
then (i) God’s F-ness exists, (ii) God’s F-ness is the truthmaker of 
‘God is F,’ and (iii) God’s F-ness is identical with God.
From (ii) and (iii), it obviously follows that God is the truthmaker of “God 
is F.” On this account, the truthmakers of “God is good” and “God is 
powerful” are God’s goodness and God’s power, each of which is identical 
with God. Unlike many accounts of divine simplicity that interpret God’s 
F-ness as a property and thus make God identical with a property, DTS 
simply identifies God’s F-ness with whatever makes “God is F” true. On 
DTS, what makes divine essential predications true is God himself—not 
facts about how God is or facts or states of affairs composed of God and 
properties that are distinct from God.
Although theists do not all agree about which divine predications are 
extrinsic or accidental, for true divine predications that are both extrinsic 
and accidental, Brower maintains that God alone will not be the truth-
maker. The truthmaker for a statement such as “God is cursed by atheists” 
will be something like a fact or state of affairs composed of God, atheists, 
and cursing. And if God’s being cursed by atheists exists, it will not be iden-
tical with God. Similarly, if the truth of “Plato is cursed by Aristotelians” 
requires the existence of Plato’s being cursed by Aristotelians exists, the latter 
will be something like a fact or state of affairs composed of Plato, Aristo-
telians, and cursing. And this will not be identical with Plato. In the case 
of true intrinsic essential predications to contingent beings—e.g., “Plato is 
human” or “Plato is an animal”—Brower and other truthmaker theorists 
contend that Plato alone is the truthmaker. However, if Plato’s humanity 
and Plato’s animality exist, they will not be identical with Plato. Thus, it 
3Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity” and “Simplicity and Aseity.”
4See Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Truthmakers,” and MacBride, “Truthmakers.”
5Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity.”
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is only in the case of intrinsic essential predications that different sorts of 
explanations will need to be given for divine and human beings.
While Brower argues that the explanation of divine simplicity in terms 
of truthmakers avoids various well-known objections that have been 
raised against the doctrine,6 Noël Saenz has recently argued that DTS 
faces difficulties of its own. Saenz’s first objection to Brower’s account of 
divine truthmaker simplicity maintains that DTS fails to satisfy the fol-
lowing important constraint on metaphysical explanation:
Truthmakers are supposed to be that which gives a metaphysical ground 
of truth, and grounds are supposed to be explanatory in nature. That is, if x 
makes < p > true, then x (or x’s existence) metaphysically explains why < p > 
is true.7
Saenz maintains that—contrary to Brower and indeed most truthmaker 
theorists—individuals by themselves cannot satisfy this explanatory 
burden:
To use Brower’s example, take an intrinsic essential predication of Plato, 
< Plato is a human > and ask “what makes this proposition true?” Notice that 
the answer cannot be Plato. Why? Because saying that this proposition is true 
in virtue of Plato or that Plato makes it true, and therefore explains why it is 
true that he is human, is explanatorily empty. . . . Plato, the concrete being, 
is just not rich enough to provide, on his own, a metaphysical ground of the 
truth of < Plato is a human >. However, if the answer to the above question is 
that the proposition is true because Plato instantiates being a human, or that 
the state of affairs of Plato’s being a human explains that it is true that Plato 
is a human, then I have been told something that is explanatorily helpful.8
Applying this line of argument to divine intrinsic essential predications, 
Saenz writes, “Merely pointing to God as an answer to “what makes 
< God is omnibenevolent > true?” is explanatorily empty.”9 In short, Saenz 
maintains that how concrete individuals are can be explanatory, but 
those individuals themselves cannot be. According to DTS, however, God 
himself is the truthmaker for intrinsic essential divine predications, and ac-
cording to Brower’s broader perspective on truthmakers, Plato alone—not 
how Plato is—is the truthmaker for “Plato is human.” On the basis of these 
explanatory shortcomings, Saenz concludes that DTS should be rejected.
An initial thing to note about Saenz’s first objection is that it is generally 
accepted among truthmaker theorists that concrete individuals alone can 
serve as truthmakers for intrinsic essential predications.10 This means that, 
while Saenz describes the focus of his attack as Brower’s DTS, his primary 
target is actually a widely supported doctrine within the truthmaker com-
6Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity” and “Simplicity and Aseity.”
7Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 463–464.
8Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 464.
9Saenz ,“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
10E.g., Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers, 128; Lewis, “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possi-
bility,” 204; and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Truthmakers,” 192.
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munity that stands behind DTS. This point is not an objection, but it does 
highlight that Saenz’s choice of target sets the bar for the success of his 
argument rather high.
In a recent attempt to defuse Saenz’s first objection, Timothy Pawl ap-
peals to the following distinction between metaphysical explanation and 
epistemic explanation that has been articulated by Karen Bennett:11
Metaphysical Explanation: “To say that one thing explainsM another is to say 
that the first fully accounts for the second, that the first makes the second 
exist or obtain or happen.”
Epistemic Explanation: “To say that one things explainsE another is to say 
that the first renders the second intelligible, sheds light on how or why it 
happened, or perhaps puts an end to a line of questioning.”
In response to Saenz, Pawl then argues:
On Bennett’s view, the grounding of truths in things (truthmaking) only re-
quires metaphysical explanation, not epistemic explanation. . . . Now, being 
that in virtue of which a proposition is true does not carry a requirement 
that the thing in virtue of which it is true be structured, or that it answer 
“why” questions satisfactorily. Or, at very least, if being that in virtue of 
which a truth is true requires structure and answering “why” questions sat-
isfactorily, that hasn’t been shown. Brower’s sense of “explain” is closer to 
Bennett’s metaphysical sense than it is to her epistemic sense. It seems to me 
that Brower and his compatriots should deny, along with Bennett, that truth-
makers must epistemically explain the truths they make true.12
Thus, while Saenz argues that because Brower’s DTS fails explanatorily, 
it fails to be correct, Pawl argues that DTS fails explanatorily in only one 
sense but that it succeeds explanatorily in another sense. I agree with Pawl 
that Saenz’s charge of explanatory inadequacy is faulty, and I think Pawl is 
correct in thinking that different senses of explanation are being conflated 
by Saenz. However, I think that Pawl’s use of Bennett’s distinctions results 
in conceding too much to Saenz.
The central reason is that metaphysical explanations explain. As such, 
they render things intelligible, shed light on how or why things happen, 
and put an end to certain lines of questioning. According to Bennett, state-
ments of the following form can be true:
(E1) X explainsM Y, but X does not explainE Y.
Since Bennett’s metaphysical explanation involves “fully accounting for” 
something, and epistemic explanation involves shedding light on things, 
this means that statements of the following form should be true as well:
11Bennett, Making Things Up, 61.
12Pawl, “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.” Pawl’s text is drawn from a con-
ference presentation. A version of this presentation, perhaps somewhat revised, will appear 
in Res Philosophica.
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(E2) X fully accounts for Y, but X does not shed any light on Y.
However, this statement seems extremely counterintuitive, if not strange. 
Bennett’s characterization of metaphysical explanations thus seems prob-
lematic.
Pawl grants that truthmakers do not do the things that epistemic expla-
nations do and thereby concedes that Saenz is correct in maintaining that 
appealing to concrete entities as truthmakers falls short explanatorily. In 
fact, Pawl seems to concede that appeals to any kind of truthmakers (and 
not simply appeals to concrete entities as truthmakers) fall short of the ex-
planatory ideal set by epistemic explanations. (There are even indications 
that Pawl may concede that explanations in metaphysics in general fall 
short of this ideal.) However, Pawl wants to claim that falling short in this 
fashion is not problematic. I think these concessions should be resisted.
In contrast to metaphysical explanations, epistemic explanations are 
supposed to put an end to lines of questioning. But here are some lines of 
questioning to which truthmaker explanations put an end:
(T1) Why is < p > true?
(T2) What makes < p > true?
(T3) What grounds the truth of < p >?
(T4) How is the truth of < p > grounded in reality?
(T5) What sort of grounding of the truth of < p > is provided by its 
truthmaker?
(T6) What sort of entity is it that grounds the truth of < p >?
(T7) Do different categories of truths have different grounds?
(T8) Do true intrinsic predications have different sorts of truthmakers 
than true extrinsic predications?
(T9) Do true essential predications have different sorts of truthmakers 
than true accidental predications?
(T10) If the truth of ‘a is F’ is grounded in or made true by how a is, is how 
a is an entity? If so, what sort of entity is it?
Granted, there might be some lines of questioning that metaphysical 
explanations in general or truthmaker explanations in particular fail to 
bring to an end. But in itself this is no objection. It is no objection to the 
explanations of spacetime provided by the equations of Einstein’s theory 
of relativity that they fail to explain why pondering the vastness of space-
time tends to fill us with a sense of awe. Thus, instead of conceding to 
Saenz that appeals to particular kinds of truthmakers (and perhaps meta-
physical explanations in general) fall short explanatorily in some sense, 
I contend that reflection on the nature of the metaphysical explanations 
provided by truthmakers reveals that they do in fact explain (i.e., render 
478 Faith and Philosophy
things intelligible, shed light on how or why things happen, and put an 
end to certain lines of questioning).
While Bennett’s distinction between metaphysical and epistemic expla-
nation does not help to explain where Saenz’s first objection goes wrong, I 
think that Pawl is correct in suggesting that at least some of the time Saenz 
confuses different senses of “explanation” that need to be distinguished. I 
propose that one relevant distinction is between things in reality that are 
responsible for a proposition’s being true and speech acts performed to 
describe those things. For example, if someone asks why a helium atom 
is positively charged, the explanation will be that the atom’s nucleus con-
tains two positively charged protons and two neutrally charged neutrons 
while its electron shell contains only one negatively charged electron. On 
the one hand, there are the number, kinds, and arrangement of things in 
reality—the protons, neutrons, electrons, and the atomic structure. On 
the other hand, there is the sentence or speech act whose content is < The 
atom’s nucleus contains two positively charged protons and two neutrally 
charged neutrons while its electron shell contains only one negatively 
charged electron >. In some sense, either one of these could be considered 
the explanation of the atom’s positive charge. From one perspective, what 
answers the relevant why-question is the existence of more protons than 
electrons within the atom. From another perspective, however, what 
answers the question is what Niels said to Ernest when he said “The at-
om’s nucleus contains two positively charged protons and two neutrally 
charged neutrons while its electron shell contains only one negatively 
charged electron.”
Saenz makes a point that seems to trade on an implicit conflation of 
these two senses of explanation when he writes, “Merely pointing to God 
as an answer to ‘what makes < God is omnibenevolent > true?’ is explana-
torily empty.”13 Saenz is asking us to imagine a communicative situation 
where a why-question has been asked but where the would-be explainer 
does nothing more than referentially designate God.14 A response that 
consisted of a single-word answer like this would seem to be conversa-
tionally inappropriate and to fail to satisfy the explanatory demands of the 
situation. However, the fuller truthmaker answer would not simply be the 
single-word answer “God.” Rather, it would involve a story about the ways 
in which truth-bearers are made true by things in reality, the kinds of things 
that can serve as truth-bearers and truthmakers, and whatever relations of 
necessitation obtain between the two. Thus, the fact such a single-word 
speech act of the sort envisioned would violate relevant conversational 
norms does not show that individual entities cannot serve as metaphysical 
13Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
14Saenz (“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 467) seems to be doing the same sort 
of thing in the following passage: “Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to metaphysically 
explain why truths are true (as Brower himself accepts), then merely appealing to a thing 
in order to explain why intrinsic essential claims about that thing are true is to provide a 
truthmaker that is too course-grained.”
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grounds of truth—nor does it show that they cannot function in illumi-
nating metaphysical explanations of important philosophical phenomena.
Furthermore, in the domain of reality (as opposed to speech acts), 
Saenz asserts truthmaker explanations violate structural constraints on 
explanations:
Plato, the concrete being, is just not rich enough to provide, on his own, a 
metaphysical ground of the truth of < Plato is a human >.15
There needs to be a kind match between what is true and its truthmaker. If 
it is true that something is some way, then what makes it true must be struc-
tured in the right kind of way if it is to explain why the predication applies 
to it. Plato is just not structured in the way he needs to be if he is to explain 
why “is a human” applies to him. But then Plato cannot explain why < Plato 
is a human > is true.16
Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to metaphysically explain why truths 
are true (as Brower himself accepts), then merely appealing to a thing in 
order to explain why intrinsic essential claims about that thing are true is to 
provide a truthmaker that is too course-grained. We (including Armstrong) 
need to dig deeper, and provide more structure in our ontology, if we want 
satisfactory truthmakers here.17
Saenz thus asserts that a truthmaker must have some appropriate struc-
ture that corresponds in some way to the structure of what it makes true. 
However, truthmaker theory denies these claims and indeed to a certain 
extent is built upon their denial. Simply asserting a view that is contrary 
to truthmaker theory fails to show the latter to be false.
Moreover, it seems straightforwardly false to claim that an explanans 
can never have less structure than its explanandum. This is tantamount to 
claiming that the complex must always be explained in terms of the equally 
complex. As a general constraint on explanation, this seems quite unintu-
itive. Consider the familiar Newtonian equation for universal gravitation:
(G) F = G(m1 x m2)/r2
Does G have as much structure as the full range of physical phenomena 
whose behavior it can explain? It is difficult to see how this can be so. 
Similar thoughts apply to any case where a universally quantified law of 
nature is capable of explaining a broad range of phenomena.
Saenz thus owes us a more detailed explanation of what constraints 
on metaphysical explanations truthmaker explanations allegedly fail to 
satisfy and why appeals to concrete individuals with less structure than 
the truths they purport to ground are supposed to be explanatorily empty. 
Because Saenz has not done this, his first objection to DTS cannot be 
deemed successful.
15Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 464.
16Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 465.
17Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 467.
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II.
Saenz’s second objection to DTS18 concerns a puzzle about the choice be-
tween the following claims:
(1) God is wise because God is divine.19
(2) God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise.20
These claims concern what Saenz calls a “priority ordering between God’s 
intrinsic essential predications”21—either predications of God’s wisdom 
are explanatorily prior to predications of God’s divinity or predications 
of God’s divinity are explanatorily prior to predications of God’s wisdom. 
Saenz contends that a choice between (1) and (2) must be made because 
they represent “jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive, positions”:
Jointly exhaustive because it is just false that the truth of < God is wise > is not 
in any way explanatorily related to the truth of < God is divine > . . . . Mutual-
ly exclusive because (1) and (2) cannot both be true on pain of violating the 
irreflexivity of explanation.22
Saenz notes that many theists, including Brower, opt for (1). Brower, for 
example, writes:
Traditional theists standardly derive the intrinsic divine attributes (or better, 
the truth of predications involving them) from their understanding of the 
divine nature. That is to say, they take God to be not only good, powerful, 
wise, and just, but to be all these things in virtue of being divine.23
Saenz argues that there are three ways the proponent of divine simplicity 
can understand this preference for (1) over (2):
(P1) Maintain that the explanatory priority of predications of God’s di-
vinity over predications of God’s wisdom is a purely conceptual 
matter;
(P2) Maintain that the explanatory priority of predications of God’s 
divinity over predications of God’s wisdom is a non-conceptual 
matter that is based upon a dependency in reality; or
(P3) Take the explanatory priority of predications of God’s divinity 
over predications of God’s wisdom to be a brute, unexplained fact.
Saenz argues that each of these options is problematic for the proponent 
of DTS and concludes that as a result DTS—and indeed any account of 
divine simplicity—should be rejected.
18Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” sec. 2.
19Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
20Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 469.
21Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
22Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 469.
23Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 117.
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The first point I would like to make about this objection is that the 
doctrine of divine simplicity does not seem to require theists to accept 
the central assumption behind Saenz’s dilemma, viz., that “[t]here exists a 
kind of priority ordering between God’s intrinsic essential predications.”24 
If God is simple, and God’s divinity and God’s wisdom are not ontologi-
cally distinct, it seems open to the proponent of divine simplicity to claim 
that predications regarding God’s divinity do not stand in relations of 
explanatory priority (or dependency) to predications of God’s wisdom. 
In other words, the dilemma that Saenz is concerned with in his second 
objection takes aim at the doctrine of divine simplicity only when it is 
combined with an additional doctrine. Thus, in a way that is reminiscent 
of Saenz’s first objection, the present objection is not a fully direct attack 
on DTS itself.
Saenz offers the following reason for thinking there are relations of 
explanatory priority and dependency between distinct divine intrinsic 
essential predications:
God’s intrinsic essential predications are not simply a list of predications ev-
ery one of which is independent from every other. They are rather a unified 
and elegant lot.25
However, standing in relations of explanatory priority and dependency 
is only one way in which a set of predications can be unified rather than 
completely disparate. For example, two predications can be unified in 
virtue of being necessarily coextensive. Relations of mutual entailment 
might obtain between the predications without any of them being more 
fundamental than any other. Moreover, they might be unified in virtue 
of having the same metaphysical ground. Thus, explanatory priority and 
dependency is only one kind of glue that might unify a set of predications.
Pawl responds to Saenz’s second objection by again appealing to the 
distinction between metaphysical and epistemic explanation and arguing 
as follows:
I see no reason to think that the proponent of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity 
requires an epistemic reading of the “because” in (1) or (2). On a metaphys-
ical reading of the explanation claims, the proponent of Divine Truthmaker 
Simplicity should say that neither predication is true because of the other 
(in Bennett’s metaphysical sense). Rather, both are true because of God. This 
response denies the need for an epistemic explanation of the form Saenz is 
asking for in his initial question and his concluding challenge. Rather than 
an epistemic explanation, there’s a metaphysical explanation (in Bennett’s 
sense). And rather than that metaphysical explanation holding between two 
propositions, that God is wise, that God is divine, it holds instead between 
God and each proposition individually.26
24Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
25Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 468.
26Pawl, “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.”
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Although I have indicated above why I think that Pawl should not rely 
upon Bennett’s distinctions between kinds of explanation, I agree with 
Pawl that the proponent of divine simplicity should insist upon meta-
physically explaining (the ground of truth of) predications of God’s 
divinity and God’s wisdom in God himself. In one sense, this amounts to 
a rejection of the dilemma for divine simplicity as represented in Saenz’s 
second objection—at least in the terms that it was posed.
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Brower all endorse P1. P2 represents 
the rejection of divine simplicity, since it asserts there is a real distinc-
tion and dependency relation between God’s divinity and God’s wisdom. 
Proponents of divine simplicity also do not endorse P3. Saenz offers the 
following argument against option P1:
It is a conceptual truth that anyone who satisfies BACHELOR does so in 
virtue of satisfying UNMARRIED and MALE since BACHELOR decom-
poses into UNMARRIED and MALE. And it is a conceptual falsehood that 
anyone who satisfies UNMARRIED and MALE does so in virtue of satisfy-
ing BACHELOR since neither UNMARRIED nor MALE decomposes into 
bachelor. So the pattern of dependency exemplified in (3) [Bill is a bachelor 
because Bill is an unmarried male] is explained by appealing to the pattern 
of dependency exemplified by the concepts involved in (3). Unfortunately, 
this kind of explanation will not work in our present case. After all, (2) is a 
conceptually coherent claim. One could defend (2) against (1) without being 
confused about the concepts WISDOM and DIVINITY. It is a live debate 
whether we should accept (1) over (2), as it would not be if the disagreement 
over them boiled down to a disagreement over the concepts involved (as it 
plausibly does in the bachelor case). (1) is therefore not a conceptual truth. 
Brower agrees when, to paraphrase him, he says that it is a real question 
whether the list of divine predications (God is good, powerful, wise, just) 
depend on the predication of God’s being divine, but that it is at least coher-
ent to say that they do. But it wouldn’t be a real question if (1) were a con-
ceptual truth. If (1) were a conceptual truth, the question would be settled 
decisively in favor of (1).27
Saenz is suggesting that conceptual questions are easily answered, con-
ceptual truths easily discerned, and conceptual disputes easily resolved. 
If that were the case, the analysis of the concepts EPISTEMIC JUSTIFI-
CATION, PERSONAL IDENTITY, and MORALLY CORRECT ACTION 
would have been resolved long ago. It is a live question how the concept of 
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION is related to the concepts of RELIABILITY, 
EVIDENCE, COHERENCE, EPISTEMIC DUTY, and EPISTEMIC VIRTUE. 
Furthermore, one epistemologist can think JUSTIFIED BELIEF is concep-
tually prior to KNOWLEDGE while another can think that the reverse 
is true without either one of them being guilty of elementary confusions 
about the concepts involved. To think that “It is a live debate whether 
< p >” and “It is a real question whether < p >” both entail “It is not a con-
ceptual question whether < p >” seems to indicate a lack of familiarity with 
27Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 470.
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the practice of philosophy. The analysis of philosophically interesting con-
cepts is much more difficult and fraught with subtle disagreements than 
the analysis of simple concepts like BACHELOR.
Saenz mistakenly claims that Brower seems to agree with him that (1) 
and (2) are not dealing with purely conceptual matters.28 Brower makes it 
quite clear in several places that he thinks whatever distinctions there are 
between divine essential attributes are merely conceptual and concern the 
sense rather than the reference of these terms. For example, Brower writes:
For even if God is absolutely simple, and hence identical with each of his 
constituents, we can still draw a conceptual distinction between God’s nature 
and his justice or power (for surely expressions such as ‘God’s nature,’ ‘God’s 
justice,’ and ‘God’s power’ are distinct in sense, even if not in reference).29
What is needed is an account that is both thin enough to preserve the cate-
gorial neutrality of referents of expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness,’ while at 
the same time thick enough to enable us to distinguish such referents when 
they are either in fact distinct (as in the case of Socrates’ nature and Socrates’ 
goodness) or merely conceptually distinct (as in the case of God’s nature and 
God’s goodness).30
Indeed, Brower makes it abundantly clear that he is following a long tradi-
tion of distinguishing between merely conceptual distinctions among the 
divine essential attributes and any real distinctions between them. For ex-
ample, Brower cites Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, who write:
According to the doctrine of simplicity, what human beings call God’s om-
nipotence or God’s omniscience is the single eternal action considered under 
descriptions they find variously illuminating, or recognized by them under 
different kinds of effects or manifestations of it. What the doctrine requires 
one to understand about all the designations for the divine attributes is that 
they are all identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various 
ways to the one actual entity which is God himself or designating various 
manifestations of it. ‘Perfect power’ and ‘perfect knowledge’ are precise 
analogues for ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’: non-synonymous 
expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same 
thing. . . . The respect in which God is utterly devoid of real distinctions does 
not, after all, preclude our conceptually distinguishing God’s actions in the 
world from one another or from God himself.31
While Plato’s wisdom and Plato’s justice are distinct in both sense and ref-
erence, God’s wisdom and God’s justice are distinct only in sense. Yet if the 
distinctions between these divine attributes are merely conceptual and not 
based in reality, it is clear that whatever priority or dependence there is 
between predications regarding these attributes is also purely conceptual 
rather than real.
28Saenz, “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” 470.
29Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 16
30Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” 23.
31Stump and Kretzmann, “Absolute Simplicity,” 356–357.
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In light of the reasons articulated in this section, I conclude that Saenz’s 
second (and final) objection to DTS fails to show that DTS should be rejected.
III.
Saenz has attempted to undermine Brower’s recent articulation of divine 
truthmaker simplicity by arguing that the latter runs afoul of various 
constraints on metaphysical explanations. Saenz’s two main objections 
are aimed at doctrines that either lie behind (objection one) or are often 
associated with (objection two) DTS. In each case, I have argued that 
Saenz makes implausible or at least unsubstantiated claims about what 
metaphysical explanation requires and have suggested ways in which the 
proponent of DTS can respond.
University at Buffalo
References
Bennett, Karen. 2017. Making Things Up (Oxford University Press).
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682683.001.0001
Bigelow, John. 1988. The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Clarendon Press).
Brower, Jeffrey E. 2008. “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy 
25: 3–30. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20082511
Brower, Jeffrey E. 2009. “Simplicity and Aseity.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philo-
sophical Theology, edited by Michael Rea and Thomas Flint (Oxford University 
Press), 105–128. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199289202.003.0006
King, Jeffrey C. 2011. “Structured Propositions.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-
ositions-structured/.
Lewis, David K. 1999. “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility.” In Papers in Meta-
physics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press), 196–214.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625343.013
MacBride, Fraser. 2013. “Truthmakers.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/.
Pawl, Timothy. 2018. “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.” Presented at 
the 2018 Henle Conference (“Scholarship and Stewardship: A Conference in 
Honor of Father Theodore Vitali”), Saint Louis University, March 10, 2018. (A 
version of this paper, somewhat revised, will appear in Res Philosophica.)
Plantinga, Alvin. 1980. Does God Have a Nature? (Marquette University Press).
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2006. “Truthmakers.” Philosophy Compass 1: 186–200.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00018.x
Saenz, Noël B. 2014. “Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy 
31: 460–474. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil2014121725
Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. 1985. “Absolute Simplicity.” Faith and 
Philosophy 2: 353–382. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19852449
